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Challenges arise in testing applications that do not have
test oracles, i.e., for which it is impossible or impractical to
know what the correct output should be for general input.
Metamorphic testing, introduced by Chen et al., has been
shown to be a simple yet effective technique in testing these
types of applications: test inputs are transformed in such a
way that it is possible to predict the expected change to the
output, and if the output resulting from this transformation
is not as expected, then a fault must exist.
Here, we improve upon previous work by presenting a new
technique called Metamorphic Runtime Checking, which au-
tomatically conducts metamorphic testing of both the entire
application and individual functions during a program’s ex-
ecution. This new approach improves the scope, scale, and
sensitivity of metamorphic testing by allowing for the identi-
fication of more properties and execution of more tests, and
increasing the likelihood of detecting faults not be found
by application-level properties alone. We also discuss a
technique for automatically discovering functions’ metamor-
phic properties, and present the results of new studies that
demonstrate that Metamorphic Runtime Checking advances
the state of the art in testing applications without oracles.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.2.4 [Software Engineering]: Software/Program Verifi-
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the testing of software, a “test oracle” [37] is required
to indicate whether the output is correct for the given input.
Despite a recent interest in the testing community in creat-
ing and evaluating test oracles [45], still there are a variety
of problem domains for which a practical test oracle does not
exist in the general case. Applications in the fields of scien-
tific computing, simulation, machine learning, etc. fall into
a category of software that Weyuker describes as “Programs
which were written in order to determine the answer in the
first place. There would be no need to write such programs,
if the correct answer were known” [48]. Thus, in the general
case, it is not possible to know the correct output in advance
for arbitrary input. In other domains, such as optimization,
determining whether the output is correct is just as difficult
as it is to derive the output in the first place, and creating
an efficient, practical oracle may not be feasible.
Although some faults in such programs - such as those
that cause the program to crash or produce results that are
obviously wrong to someone who knows the domain - are
easily found, and partial oracles may exist for a subset of
the input domain, subtle errors in performing calculations
or in adhering to specifications can be much more difficult
to identify without a practical, general oracle.
Much of the recent research into addressing the so-called
“oracle problem” has focused on the use of a technique called
metamorphic testing [8] in domains such as bioinformatics
[9], machine learning [29, 50], scientific computing [21], and
simulation [10, 40]. As the name implies, in metamorphic
testing changes are made to existing test inputs in such a
way (based on the program’s“metamorphic properties”) that
it is possible to predict what the change to the output should
be. That is, if program input I produces output O, addi-
tional test inputs based on transformations of I are gener-
ated in such a manner that the change to O (if any) can
be predicted. In cases where the correctness of the original
output O cannot be determined, i.e., if there is no test ora-
cle, program failure can still be detected if the change to O
is not as expected when using the new input.
Through our own past investigations into metamorphic
testing [29, 30, 31], we have garnered three key insights.
First, the metamorphic properties of individual functions
are often different than those of the application as a whole.
Thus, by checking for additional and different relationships,
we can reveal defects that would not be detected using only
the metamorphic properties of the full application. Second,
the metamorphic properties of individual functions can be
checked in the course of executing metamorphic tests on the
full application. This addresses the problem of generating
test cases from which to derive new inputs, since we can sim-
ply use those inputs with which the functions happened to be
invoked within the full application. Third, when conducting
tests of individual functions within the full running applica-
tion in this manner, checking the metamorphic properties of
one function can sometimes detect defects in other functions,
which may not have any known metamorphic properties, be-
cause the functions share internal application state.
In order to advance the state of the art in testing appli-
cations that do not have practical, general test oracles, this
paper seeks to make metamorphic testing more effective by
improving: the number and types of metamorphic proper-
ties that can be checked (scope); the number and types of
metamorphic tests that are run for a single program input
(scale); and the likelihood of revealing subtle faults that
would not cause a violation of an application-level meta-
morphic property (sensitivity).
In order to realize these improvements, we present a solu-
tion based on checking the metamorphic properties of the en-
tire application and those of individual functions (or meth-
ods, procedures, subroutines, etc.) as the full application
runs. That is, the program under test is not treated only
as a black box, but rather metamorphic testing also occurs
within the application, at the function level, in the context
of the running program. This will allow for the execution
of more tests and also makes it possible to check for subtle
faults inside the code that may not cause violations of the
application’s metamorphic properties.
Although we have previously presented some initial ob-
servations regarding the implementation and effectiveness
of such a technique [32], this paper extends that work by
making four contributions:
1. A new type of testing called Metamorphic Run-
time Checking (Section 3). This is a new approach
that improves metamorphic testing in that metamor-
phic properties of individual functions, not only the
entire application, are also specified and then checked
as the program is running.
2. A new technique for automatically discovering meta-
morphic properties (Section 4). This is done by start-
ing out with a set of possible properties and ruling
them out as they are violated during program execu-
tion, analogous to the automatic detection of likely
program invariants [16].
3. An architecture of a Metamorphic Runtime Checking
framework called Columbus (Section 5). This archi-
tecture allows for checking both application-level and
function-level metamorphic properties as the program
runs.
4. The results of new studies that show that Metamor-
phic Runtime Checking is more effective than other
techniques in detecting faults in programs without test
oracles (Section 6).
Although Metamorphic Runtime Checking does not pre-
clude other testing approaches, and could presumably be
applied to applications that do have oracles, the focus of
this work is on those that do not.
2. BACKGROUND
Metamorphic testing [8] was introduced as a general tech-
nique for creating follow-up test cases based on existing
ones, particularly those that have not revealed any faults,
by reusing test cases to create additional test inputs whose
expected outputs can be predicted. In metamorphic test-
ing, if input x produces an output f(x), the function’s (or
application’s) metamorphic properties can be used to guide
the creation of a transformation function t, which can be
applied to the input to produce t(x); this transformation
then allows us to predict the output f(t(x)), based on the
(already known) value of f(x). In the case where f has an
oracle, then if we know that f(x) is correct, we could also
know whether f(t(x)) is correct. Studies have shown that
these additional test cases have fault-finding capabilities be-
yond that of the original test set [51].
For a simple example of metamorphic testing, consider a
function that calculates the standard deviation of a set of
numbers. Certain transformations of the set would be ex-
pected to produce the same result: for instance, permuting
the order of the elements should not affect the calculation,
nor should multiplying each value by -1. Furthermore, other
transformations should alter the output, but in a predictable
way: if each value in the set were multiplied by 2, then the
standard deviation should be twice that of the original set.
Clearly metamorphic testing can be very useful in the
absence of an oracle: even if it were not possible to know
whether the initial output is correct, if the new output that
results from transforming the input does not have the ex-
pected relationship with the original output, then a fault
must exist in the implementation [11, 51]. Although satisfy-
ing these metamorphic properties does not indicate correct-
ness, a violation of a property would indicate that one (or
both) of the outputs is incorrect.
As an example from the domain of machine learning, a-
nomaly-based network intrusion detection systems build a
model of “normal” traffic based on previous observations,
and then later look for outliers that may be indicative of an
attack. The model may be created according to the byte
distribution of incoming network payloads, since the dis-
tribution in worms, viruses, etc. may deviate from that of
normal network traffic [47]. When a new payload arrives, its
byte distribution is then compared to the model, and any-
thing deemed anomalous causes an alert. When testing such
a program, it may not be possible to know a priori whether
a particular input should raise an alert, since it is entirely
dependent on the model. However, if while the program is
running we take the new payload and randomly permute the
order of its bytes, the result (anomalous or not) should be
the same, since the model only concerns the distribution, not
the order. If the result is not the same, and this property is
violated, then a fault must exist in the implementation.
Despite recent successes in demonstrating that metamor-
phic testing can be effectively applied to real-world programs
in domains for which there is no practical, general test or-
acle (e.g., [9], [10], [40], [50], etc.), there is still room for
improvement when it comes to its ability to detect faults.
By identifying more metamorphic properties (i.e., increas-
ing the scope), deriving more test cases for each program
input (increasing the scale), and checking for subtle faults
that may not cause a violation of application-level meta-
morphic properties (increasing the sensitivity), we can make



















Figure 1: Model of Metamorphic Runtime Checking of program P and its constituent function f.
3. APPROACH
Here we introduce a new technique called Metamorphic
Runtime Checking, which can be considered a cross between
metamorphic testing and runtime assertion checking [12], in
that the metamorphic properties that are checked are anal-
ogous to program invariants: at the point in the program
execution in which the function is called, its metamorphic
properties are expected to hold, given the current function
inputs and application state. Although we cannot know for
certain just from observation that a given property will al-
ways hold, if the metamorphic property is ever violated, then
a fault has been revealed.
Metamorphic Runtime Checking is an extension of our
previous work in Automated Metamorphic System Testing
[31], in which an application’s metamorphic properties are
specified and then the program is executed multiple times:
once with the original input, and then again for each of
the transformed inputs, according to the properties, after
which the new outputs are compared to the original to de-
termine whether any properties have been violated. Despite
the demonstrated effectiveness of this approach, it does not
utilize properties of individual functions, only those of the
entire application.
In our new approach, additional metamorphic tests are
logically attached to the functions for which metamorphic
properties have been specified. Upon a function’s execution,
the corresponding tests are executed as well: the arguments
are modified according to the specification of the function’s
metamorphic properties, the function is run again in the
same application state as the original, and the output of
the function with the original input is compared to that of
the function with the modified input. If the result is not
as expected according to the specified property, then a fault
has been exposed.
As shown in Figure 1, the tester provides a program in-
put to a Metamorphic Runtime Checking framework, which
then transforms it according to the metamorphic property
of the program P (for simplicity, this diagram only shows one
metamorphic property, but a program may, of course, have
multiple). The framework then invokes P with both the orig-
inal input and the transformed input; as seen at the bottom
of the diagram, when each program invocation is finished,
the outputs can be checked according to the property.
While each invocation of P is running, though, metamor-
phic properties of individual functions can be checked as
well. As shown on the left side of Figure 1, in the invoca-
tion of P with the original program input, before a function
f is called, its input x can be transformed according to the
function’s property to give t(x). The function is called with
each input, and then f(t(x)) is evaluated according to the
original value of f(x) to see if the property is violated.
Meanwhile, in the additional invocation of P (right side of
the diagram), function-level metamorphic testing still occurs
for function f, this time using input x’, which results from
the transformed program input to P. In this case, f(t(x’))
and f(x’) are compared.
By incorporating function-level metamorphic properties
into the testing, we can improve the scope and scale of meta-
morphic testing by running more tests using more proper-
ties and more inputs. In this example, if we used only the
application-level property of P, we would run just one test.
However, by also considering P’s functions, we can now check
two properties and run a total of three tests. Additionally,
this also allows us to improve the sensitivity of metamorphic
testing by revealing subtle faults at the function level that
may not violate application-level properties.
In order to conduct Metamorphic Runtime Checking, the
tester must first identify the metamorphic properties of the
application to be tested and its constituent functions. This
can be done manually, using domain knowledge or guide-
lines as presented in [29], or can be done automatically, as
described in Section 4.
Once the metamorphic properties have been determined,
they must be expressed in such a way that the properties
can be checked at runtime. In previous work, we discussed
the use of configuration files for specifying application-level
properties [31], and we have also explored using code annota-
tions based on the Java Modeling Language [23] for function-
level properties [32]. Any of these approaches can be used
in Metamorphic Runtime Checking.
Last, testing can commence. Unlike in conventional unit
testing, in Metamorphic Runtime Checking the tester need
not construct any specific test harness; rather, metamorphic
testing is conducted by simply executing the program with
selected test inputs. The testing framework would allow
for the checking of both application-level and function-level
properties, and report any violations. The architecture for
such a framework is presented in Section 5.
4. AUTOMATIC DISCOVERY OF LIKELY
METAMORPHIC PROPERTIES
An open issue in the research on metamorphic testing is,
“where do the metamorphic properties come from?” Pre-
vious attempts to answer this question involve the use of
guidelines [29, 30], constructing properties as combinations
of existing ones [24], and using machine learning to suggest
properties based on structural similarity to other pieces of
code [22]. Here we present a new approach to discovering
properties based on observing program execution.
As described above, a metamorphic property of a function
f describes a transformation of the input such that we can
predict the change to the output. That is, we apply a trans-
formation function t to the input x to get t(x), and then
calculate f(t(x)), which we then compare to some transfor-
mation g of the original output f(x). Thus, we can define a
metamorphic property of a function f as “a pair of functions
(t, g) such that f(t(x)) = g(f(x)) for all x”. It follows, then,
that to determine the metamorphic properties of f, we need
to find functions t and g for which this is true.
In practice, of course, it is not feasible to find all functions
t and g, but in the same way that invariant detection tools
start with a set of possible invariants and eliminate/refine
them as they are violated during program execution [16], we
can discover metamorphic properties of the code by trying
combinations of functions t on the input and functions g on
the output. Any combination for which f(t(x)) = g(f(x))
is never violated can therefore be hypothesized as a likely
metamorphic property.
In order to assist with the identification of metamorphic
properties, a testing framework that implements Metamor-
phic Runtime Checking can have a “discovery mode”: rather
than checking for the violation of a user-specified set of prop-
erties, it can try combinations of transformation functions on
the input and output domains, and report as likely proper-
ties those combinations that were never violated. Note that
these are not the same as program invariants, which relate
to relationships between variables; these properties relate to
relationships between multiple function executions.
As an example, consider a function k whose input is an
array of ints A. For this particular input domain, we can ap-
ply well-known set transformations (e.g., permuting, sort-
ing, reversing) as well as numeric transformations on the
individual elements (e.g., adding a constant, multiplying by
a constant, etc.) to get new inputs A’. The simplest meta-
morphic property is that changing the input does not change
the output, i.e., k(A’) = k(A). For each transformation that
derives a new input from A, if this property is violated, then
it is omitted from consideration. Subsequent invocations of
k with different inputs can refine this set of properties even
further, until the only ones remaining are those that were
never violated.
Given the output domain of k, we can try additional trans-
formations as well by looking for changes to k(A) such that it
equals k(A’). Overall, if we have m possible transformations
in the input domain and n in the output domain, we can try
all mn combinations; those that are never violated are thus
reported as likely properties.
There are, of course, well-known limitations to such an
approach. Observing program execution to derive properties
may lead to false positives (i.e., thinking that a property
is sound when it actually is not) or false negatives (when
what should be a sound property is not reported because
of a bug in the implementation), and only reports what the
properties are and not what they should be.
However, the Metamorphic Runtime Checking approach
described in Section 3 is not restricted to only those proper-
ties discovered by this technique. The tester is certainly free
to identify and specify additional properties, or to rule out
spurious properties that only hold for the selected inputs;
we simply suggest this technique simply to assist in identi-
fying likely properties from a list of known common ones for
various input and output domains.
Due to space limitations, we do not investigate this ap-
proach further in this paper, in terms of the soundness of
the properties and their fault-finding capabilities, except
to point out that in our empirical studies (Section 6), the
function-level properties discovered by this approach are ef-
fective at revealing bugs in the software not identified by
application-level properties, and thus improve the overall
effectiveness of metamorphic testing.
5. ARCHITECTURE
In this section we introduce the architecture of a testing
framework for Metamorphic Runtime Checking, which we
call Columbus.
5.1 Overview of Application-Level Testing
The Columbus framework is an extension of the Amster-
dam framework for application-level metamorphic testing,
which we introduced in our work on Automated Metamor-
phic System Testing [31] and is only summarized here.
In the Amsterdam framework, metamorphic properties of
the entire application are specified using a configuration file.
The framework executes the program with the original in-
put, and then modifies the program inputs according to the
properties. The program is then run again with the new
inputs, but additional invocations are run in separate sand-
boxes so that they do not interfere with each other. Once all
executions have finished, the outputs are checked according
to the specified properties, and any violations are reported.
The Columbus framework builds upon Amsterdam by al-
lowing testers to also specify function-level properties, and
then by conducting additional metamorphic testing as the
program invocations execute, as described below.
1: Columbus 
intercepts call to f(x)
2: Create sandbox 7: Execute normally
3: Transform x to t(x)
4: Execute f(t(x))
5: Compare Outputs






Figure 2: Model of Columbus framework for
function-level metamorphic testing.
5.2 Function-Level Testing
In order to perform metamorphic testing of an individual
function during the execution of the program, the Columbus
framework needs to: execute the function with the original
input and get the original output; transform the input ac-
cording to the specified metamorphic property; call the func-
tion again, this time with the new input, but in the same
application state as the original function call; and then get
the new output and compare it to the original, again accord-
ing to the specified property, to see whether the property was
violated. All but the first of these steps would be repeated
for each of the function’s specified properties.
One challenge is that the testing framework must ensure
that the additional function invocations do not adversely af-
fect the state of the running program: the goal is that the
instrumented application should still produce the same out-
put as an uninstrumented version, even though Metamor-
phic Runtime Checking is being conducted. For instance,
assume that the program calls function f with input x, which
is transformed according to the metamorphic property to
t(x). In order for the program to continue to run as nor-
mal after the metamorphic tests have been run, the testing
framework must ensure that the return value sent to the call-
ing function is f(x), and not f(t(x)). Likewise, any side
effect of calling f(x), such as modifying a global variable,
must be permitted, but the framework must make sure that
any side effect of calling f(t(x)) is hidden.
Since existing runtime assertion checking techniques (as
surveyed in [12]) and monitoring tools (such as Gamma [36])
do not support multiple function executions and do not safe-
guard against side effects, a new solution is required.
Figure 2 shows how the Columbus framework supports
function-level metamorphic testing. First, the framework
intercepts the call to function f, which can be accomplished
through wrapping the function or by injecting code. Note
that neither the signature of the function nor its return
type is changed, and the calling function is never aware that
metamorphic testing is being conducted.
Before the body of function f is invoked, the framework
must create a “sandbox” so that the extra function calls do
not affect the state of the running application. In native lan-
guages like C and C++, this can be accomplished by forking
the process: the test inherits the state of the program at the
time of the original function call, but does not affect it when
the function is run a second time. In managed languages like
Java and C#, for which forking the entire virtual machine
is unwieldy, deep cloning can be used to make copies of all
objects that may be affected. A new thread can then be
spawned here, using references to the sandboxed/cloned ob-
jects, instead of the original.
In the process or thread running the test, the input x to
the function f is first modified according to the particular
metamorphic property to give t(x). The transformation
that should be applied to the input can be specified using
code annotations [32], a configuration file, etc. Next the
(uninstrumented) implementation of the function is invoked
using this new input t(x).
Meanwhile, in the process/thread that is doing the origi-
nal function call (right-hand side of Figure 2), the function
f is invoked with the unmodified input x, and once it com-
pletes, the output f(x) can be logged or immediately shared
with the test. If the tests are running in a separate process
from the original, then a mechanism like shared memory or
message passing would need to be used here, otherwise this
can be done with a global/static variable.
Once the test case has determined that the original func-
tion call has finished, e.g., using signals between processes
or by using shared flags, the outputs f(x) and f(t(x)) are
compared according to the metamorphic property. As with
the transformation, the function g used for checking the out-
puts must be specified, and then success or failure can be
indicated here by determining whether f(t(x)) = g(f(x)).
Finally, the test terminates, the output f(x) that results
from the original input is returned to the calling function,
and the rest of the program continues as normal.
5.3 Prototype Implementations
In order to conduct the experiments described in the fol-
lowing section, we created prototype implementations of the
Columbus framework for both C and Java applications. For
specifying the metamorphic properties and generating the
test cases, we built upon our previous work [32] using code
annotations based on the Java Modeling Language [23]. For
creating the sandbox and sharing the function outputs, we
modified the Invite framework used for “in vivo testing” [28],
which allows for the execution of unit tests alongside a run-
ning program. The performance overhead introduced by
these tools is discussed in Section 6.4.
6. EMPIRICAL STUDIES
To evaluate the effectiveness of Metamorphic Runtime
Checking at detecting faults in applications without test or-
acles, we compare it to runtime assertion checking using
program invariants. When used in applications without test
oracles, assertions can ensure some degree of correctness by
checking that function input and output values are within
a specified range, the relationships between variables are
maintained, and a function’s effects on the application state
are as expected [34]. While satisfying the invariants does
not ensure correctness, any violation of them at runtime in-
dicates an error.
Table 1: Applications used in experiment.
Application-Level Function-Level
Application Metamorphic Metamorphic
Name Domain Language LOC Functions Invariants Properties Properties
C4.5 classification C 5,285 141 27,603 4 40
GAFFitter optimization C++ 1,159 19 744 2 11
JSim simulation Java 3,024 468 306 2 12
K-means clustering Java 717 46 137 4 12
LDA topic modeling Java 1,630 103 1,323 4 28
Lucene information Java 661 57 456 4 26
retrieval
MartiRank ranking C 804 19 3,647 4 15
PAYL anomaly Java 4,199 164 19,730 2 40
detection
SVM classification Java 1,213 49 2,182 4 4
Although we are not aware of any other work that has
specifically attempted to determine the “state of the art”
for testing applications without oracles, runtime assertion
checking is mentioned as a common and effective technique
in the literature, e.g., Baresi and Young’s survey paper [4]
on techniques for testing applications without test oracles,
and Kanewala and Bieman’s paper [21] on testing programs
used in computational science. Additionally, using invariant
detection tools, this approach is easy to automate, and does
not rely on a human tester, as do other approaches such as
N-Version Programming or creating a formal specification.
6.1 Experimental Setup
The experiments described in this section seek to answer
the following research questions:
1. Is Metamorphic Runtime Checking more effective than
using runtime assertion checking for detecting faults in
applications without test oracles?
2. What contribution do application-level and function-
level metamorphic properties make to the effectiveness
of Metamorphic Runtime Checking?
3. Is Metamorphic Runtime Checking suitable for practi-
cal use?
6.1.1 Target Applications
In these experiments, we applied both runtime assertion
checking and Metamorphic Runtime Checking to nine real-
world applications that are representative of different do-
mains that have no practical, general test oracles: supervised
machine learning (classification, clustering, and ranking),
data mining (information retrieval and topic modeling), dis-
crete event simulation, and optimization. The applications
include: C4.5 [39], a decision tree-based machine learning
classification algorithm; GAFFitter [17], an optimization
program that uses a genetic algorithm implemented to solve
the bin-packing problem; JSim [41], a discrete event simu-
lation engine developed at UMass Amherst; K-means [25],
a clustering algorithm as implemented in the Mahout [3]
framework; Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) [7], a
topic modeling algorithm, also as implemented in Mahout;
Lucene [2], a text search engine library that is part of the
Apache framework; MartiRank [18], a machine learning
ranking algorithm, which was developed by researchers at
Columbia University’s Center for Computational Learning
Systems; PAYL [47], an anomaly-based intrusion detection
system implemented by researchers in Columbia University’s
Intrusion Detection System Lab; and Support Vector Ma-
chines (SVM) [46], a machine learning classification algo-
rithm, as implemented in the Weka [49] open-source toolkit.
More detail about the applications is provided in Table
1. Note that for the Java applications, the information only
includes the implementations of the specific algorithms, and
not any underlying frameworks.
6.1.2 Identifying Program Invariants
To identify assertions, we used the Daikon invariant de-
tection tool [16]. Daikon observes the execution of multiple
program runs and creates a set of likely invariants, which
can then be used as assertions for subsequent runs of the
program. Although it is possible to customize the types
of invariants that Daikon can detect, in our experiments
we only use its out-of-the-box features. Note that the in-
variants created by Daikon only include function pre- and
post-conditions, and do not incorporate any assertions that
are within the function itself; future work could consider
the effectiveness of runtime assertion checking when using
in-function invariants, though these would need to be gen-
erated by hand.
To create the set of invariants that we could use for run-
time assertion checking, we applied Daikon to each appli-
cation, using the following data sets as input: for SVM,
C4.5, and K-means, 10 of the most popular data sets from
the UC-Irvine repository of machine learning data sets [33];
for MartiRank, ten randomly generated data sets of various
sizes; for PAYL, network traffic on our department’s LAN
over a one-hour period; for Lucene and LDA, the corpus of
Shakespeare’s comedies [27]; and for GAFFitter, a collection
of 84 files ranging in size from 118 bytes to 14.9MB.
6.1.3 Identifying Metamorphic Properties
To identify the application-level metamorphic properties
for the experiment, we used our implementations of the
Columbus framework in“discovery”mode as described above
in Section 4, based on observing program executions with
the same data sets used for detecting invariants with Daikon.
Note that, for these properties, we simply treat the applica-
tion as a black box, apply common transformations to the
inputs (based on the input domain and file format), apply
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Figure 3: Results of mutation analysis, showing percentage of mutants killed by each approach.
common transformations to the outputs, and look for any
combinations that are never violated.
To identify function-level properties, we again used our
Columbus implementations in “discovery” mode, this time
for the individual functions, using the same program inputs
as described above. Note that we did not construct sepa-
rate inputs for the functions, but rather the framework used
whatever values were passed along during the execution of
the entire program.
Since our Columbus implementations can currently only
discover properties based on function arguments and return
values, and not on side effects or application state, this
meant that we could not identify properties for functions
that took no inputs and/or had no return value. And since
we were not involved in the development of any of these ap-
plications, someone with more knowledge of the domains or
implementations probably could have identified additional
properties. However, as shown below, the properties that
were discovered still had fault-finding capabilities, and pre-
vious studies [20, 26] have shown that these are the types of
properties that tend to be identified by humans anyway.
The total numbers of application-level and function-level
metamorphic properties are listed in Table 1.
6.1.4 Methodology
To determine the effectiveness of the testing techniques,
we used mutation analysis to systematically insert faults into
the source code of the applications described above, and
then determined whether the mutants could be killed (i.e.,
whether the faults could be detected) using each approach.
Mutation analysis has been shown to be suitable for eval-
uation of effectiveness [1], and is generally accepted as the
most objective mechanism for comparing the effectiveness of
different testing techniques [15, 44].
Each mutated version of the program had exactly one mu-
tation. Mutations that yielded a fatal runtime error (crash),
an infinite loop, or an output that was clearly wrong (for in-
stance, not conforming to the expected output syntax, or
simply being blank) were discarded since any reasonable
approach would detect such faults. We also did not con-
sider “equivalent mutants” for which all inputs produced the
same program output as the original, unmutated version,
e.g., those mutants that were not on the execution path for
any test case.
For each mutated version, we conducted runtime asser-
tion checking with the invariants detected by Daikon. If any
invariant were violated, the mutant was considered killed.
We then performed Metamorphic Runtime Checking on the
same mutated versions to determine whether any of the
metamorphic properties discovered by Columbus were vio-
lated. The inputs used for mutation analysis were the same
as those used for detecting invariants and properties, so as
to avoid any issues related to spuriousness (see Threats to
Validity below).
6.2 Evaluation of Effectiveness
Here we answer the first research question: “Is Metamor-
phic Runtime Checking more effective than using runtime
assertion checking for detecting faults in applications with-
out test oracles?”
Table 2 and Figure 3 summarize the results of the first
experiment. The variation in the number of mutants for
each application is due to the different sizes of the source
code, the different number of points in which mutations
could be inserted, the number of equivalent mutants, and
the different number of mutants that led to fatal errors or
obviously wrong output. Overall, Metamorphic Runtime
Checking was more effective, killing 1,602 (90.4%) of the
mutants in the applications, compared to just 1,498 (84.5%)
for assertion checking.
Broadly speaking, Metamorphic Runtime Checking was
more effective at killing mutants that related to operations
on arrays, sets, collections, etc. As an example, MartiRank
Table 2: Results of mutation analysis for Metamor-
phic Runtime Checking (MRC) and runtime asser-
tion checking (RAC).
Mutants Killed
Application #Mutants MRC RAC
C4.5 856 823 804
GAFFitter 66 36 20
K-means 35 28 26
JSim 36 36 36
LDA 24 24 24
Lucene 15 14 9
MartiRank 413 390 366
PAYL 40 29 13
SVM 287 222 200
Total 1,772 1,602 1,498
includes a function that evaluates the “quality” of a ranking
by using a variant of the Area Under the Curve [19] metric
for an array of items, and some mutations in the experiment
caused the function to omit elements of the array. Daikon
might detect that the quality is always a positive value, that
the array does not change, etc., but none of these would be
violated as a result of this mutation. However, the meta-
morphic property that permuting the elements in the array
should not affect the output would be violated, if a differ-
ent element were omitted upon additional invocation of the
function, and in this case the bug would be found.
On the other hand, runtime assertion checking was more
effective at killing mutants that affected the value of particu-
lar calculations. Such an example comes from the FormTree
function used to create nodes of the decision tree in C4.5.
Part of this function calculates the frequency with which a
class (or “label”) appears in the input data by looking at
each item in the training data and updating a variable with
the appropriate weight.
A mutation in this function such that the addition of the
weight is changed to subtraction may cause the value of the
variable to become negative, in violation of the invariant
(detected by Daikon) that the frequency should always be
greater than or equal to zero; thus, the defect is detected.
However, metamorphic testing does not reveal this defect:
the changes made to the training data values do not affect
the calculation of class frequency, and even though the re-
sulting output is incorrect, none of the metamorphic trans-
formations cause the properties to be violated.
Further analysis could more specifically characterize the
types of faults each approach is most suitable for detecting,
but it follows, then, that runtime assertion checking and
Metamorphic Runtime Checking should be used together in
the testing of applications without test oracles. When used
in combination in our experiments, they were able to kill
95% of the mutants: only 88 of the 1,772 survived.
6.3 Contributions to Effectiveness
We now address the second research question: “What con-
tribution do application-level and function-level metamor-
phic properties make to the effectiveness of Metamorphic
Runtime Checking?”
Table 3 shows the results with the mutants grouped by (a)
those that were killed only by application-level metamorphic
properties, (b) those that were killed only by function-level
properties, (c) those that were killed by both types of prop-
erties, and (d) those that were not killed by either one.
Whereas application-level metamorphic properties killed a
majority of the mutants (a combined total of 1465 mutants,
or 82.6%, considering those only killed by application-level
properties and those killed by both types), it is certainly
a noteworthy result that function-level properties could kill
an additional 137 mutants (7.7%) that went undetected by
application-level properties. As described in the following
paragraphs, this happened primarily because we were able
to increase: the number of properties identified (scope); the
number of tests run (scale); and the likelihood that a fault
would be detected (sensitivity).
The improvement in the scope of metamorphic testing
was particularly clear in the anomaly-based intrusion detec-
tion system PAYL. The Columbus framework was only to
discover two application-level metamorphic properties be-
cause it was not possible to create new program inputs based
on modifying the values of the bytes inside the payloads
(say, increasing them), since the application itself only al-
lowed for particular syntactically and semantically valid in-
puts that reflected what it considered to be “real” network
traffic. These two properties were only able to kill two of
the 40 mutants. However, once we could use Metamorphic
Runtime Checking to run metamorphic tests at the function
level, Columbus was able to identify many more properties
that involved changing the byte arrays that were passed as
function arguments, thus revealing 27 additional faults.
Likewise, we were able to increase the scale of metamor-
phic testing by running many more test cases. For instance,
in MartiRank, even though Columbus discovered function-
level properties for only a handful of functions, many of those
are called numerous times per program execution, mean-
ing that there are many opportunities for the property to
be violated. A single execution of MartiRank consists of a
number of “rounds” in which the set of input data is broken
into sub-lists: there are N sub-lists in the N th round, each
containing 1/N th of the total number of positive examples
(i.e., examples with a label of 1). Each of the N sub-lists
is sorted by each attribute, ascending and descending, and
then MartiRank determines the attribute and sorting direc-
tion for which the sorting gives the best“quality” ranking, as
described above. In our tests, we ran MartiRank with the
default 10 rounds, meaning that the functions to sort the
elements and calculate the quality were each run over 100
times. Since many of the inputs had 100 attributes in the
data set, and each function had four properties, that’s over
40,000 test cases per function from just a single execution
of the program!
Another reason why function-level properties were able to
kill mutants not killed by application-level properties is that
we were able to improve the sensitivity in terms of the abil-
ity to reveal more subtle faults, as seen in GAFFitter. In the
function to calculate the “fitness” of a given candidate solu-
tion in the genetic algorithm, i.e., how close to the optimal
solution (target) a candidate comes, one of the metamorphic
properties is that changing the ordering of the elements in
the candidate solution should not affect the result, since it
is merely taking a sum of all the elements.
If, for instance, there is a mutation such that an last el-
ement is omitted from the calculation, then the metamor-
phic property will be violated since the return value will be
Table 3: Number of mutants killed by different types of metamorphic properties.
Mutants Killed by
Application-level Function-level
Application Total Mutants Properties Only Properties Only Both Types Not Killed
C4.5 856 133 37 653 33
GAFFitter 66 2 14 20 30
K-means 35 6 11 11 7
JSim 36 14 0 22 0
LDA 24 2 0 22 0
Lucene 15 5 3 6 1
MartiRank 413 298 22 70 23
PAYL 40 0 27 2 11
SVM 287 69 23 130 65
Total 1,772 529 137 936 170
different after the second function call. However, at the ap-
plication level, such a fault is unlikely to be detected, since
the metamorphic property simply states that the quality of
the solutions should be increasing with subsequent genera-
tions. Even though the value of the fitness is incorrect, it
would still be increasing (unless the omitted element had a
very large effect on the result, which is unlikely), and the
property would not be violated.
One of the more interesting results of this experiment is
that some of the newly discovered faults were in functions
for which metamorphic properties had not been identified
and thus were not being checked using function-level prop-
erties. These faults put the application into a state in which
the metamorphic property of another function would be vi-
olated. For instance, the pauc function in MartiRank is
passed an array of numbers and performs a calculation on
them to determine the quality of the ranking, returning a
normalized result between 0 and 1. One of the metamor-
phic properties of that calculation is that pauc(A’) = 1 -
pauc(A) where A’ is the array in which the values of A are in
reverse order. However, a fault in a separate function that
deals with how the array was populated caused this prop-
erty to be violated because the data structure holding the
array itself was in an invalid state, even though the code to
perform the calculation was in fact correct.
As a slight simplification, we can explain this as follows:
the values in the array A were being stored in a doubly-linked
list, so that MartiRank could calculate the “quality” of the
list by looking at it forwards (ascending) and backwards
(descending). A mutation in the function that created the
linked list caused some of the links to “previous” nodes to
point to the wrong ones. In this case, traversing the linked
list in the forward direction would give ABCDE, but backwards
would give EDBCA, for instance. The metamorphic property
that pauc(A) = 1 - pauc(A’) would only hold if A’ were,
in fact, the exact opposite ordering of A, but clearly in this
case it is not, and Metamorphic Runtime Checking was able
to detect this fault.
6.4 Performance Overhead
Last, we answer the research question, “Is Metamorphic
Runtime Checking suitable for practical use?” by consider-
ing the performance impact of using such an approach.
Although Metamorphic Runtime Checking using function-
level properties is able to detect faults not found by meta-
morphic testing based on application-level properties alone,
this runtime checking of the properties comes at a cost, par-
ticularly if the tests are run frequently. In application-level
metamorphic testing, the program needs to be run one more
time with the transformed input, and then each metamor-
phic property is checked exactly once (just at the end of the
program execution). In Metamorphic Runtime Checking,
however, each property can be checked numerous times, de-
pending on the number of times each function is called, and
the overhead can grow to be much higher.
During the studies discussed above, we measured the per-
formance overhead of our C and Java implementations of
the Columbus framework. Tests were conducted on a server
with a quad-core 3GHz CPU running Ubuntu 7.10 with 2GB
RAM. On average, the performance overhead for the Java
applications was around 3.5ms per test; for C, it was only
0.4ms per test. This cost is mostly attributed to the time it
takes to create the sandbox and test process or thread.
This impact can certainly be substantial from a percent-
age overhead point of view if many tests are run in a short-
lived program. For instance, for C4.5, the overhead was on
the order of 10x, even though in absolute terms it was well
under a second. However, we point out that, for most the
programs we investigated in our study, the overhead was
typically less than a few minutes, which we consider a small
price to pay for being able to detect faults in programs with-
out a practical, general test oracle.
6.5 Threats to Validity
In our study, we used Daikon to create the program in-
variants for runtime assertion checking. Although in prac-
tice invariants may typically be generated by hand, and
some researchers have questioned the usefulness of Daikon-
generated invariants compared to those generated by hu-
mans [38], we chose to use the tool so that we could elimi-
nate any human bias or human error in creating the invari-
ants. Additionally, others have independently shown that
metamorphic properties are more effective at detecting de-
fects than manually identified invariants [20], though for pro-
grams on a smaller scale than those in our experiment (a few
hundred lines, as opposed to thousands as in many of the
programs we used).
Daikon can generate spurious invariants if there are not
enough program executions or if there are bugs in the code
(likewise, the same can be said about Columbus and the
metamorphic properties it discovers), but we mitigated this
by using the same inputs for the mutation analysis experi-
ment as for the generation of invariants and properties. Re-
gardless of whether these “should” hold for the various func-
tions, any violation of them would necessarily be coming
from the inserted mutation, since they were never violated
by those inputs in the unmutated version.
Last, the ability of metamorphic testing to reveal fail-
ures is clearly dependent on the selection of metamorphic
properties, and the results may have varied had we used dif-
ferent ones instead. However, we have shown that a basic
set of metamorphic properties identified by Columbus can
be used even without a particularly strong understanding
of the implementation. Using this approach, therefore, we
are demonstrating the minimum effectiveness of Metamor-
phic Runtime Checking; the use of domain-specific proper-
ties may actually reveal even more failures [50].
7. RELATEDWORK
Although Metamorphic Runtime Checking is similar to
runtime assertion checking, there are some key differences
between metamorphic properties and program invariants.
First, invariants and assertions address how variables re-
late to each other, or variable’s expected values, but do not
describe the expected relations between outputs that result
from multiple executions with transformed inputs. Addi-
tionally, in practice assertions typically are read-only and
do not have side effects; in our approach, though, the prop-
erties rely on additional invocations of the functions, which
are allowed to have side effects, but these side effects are
contained so as not to affect the running program.
Metamorphic properties are similar in some ways to alge-
braic specifications [13], though algebraic specifications of-
ten declare legal sequences of function calls that should pro-
duce an expected result, but do not describe how a particular
function should react when its input is changed. The run-
time checking of algebraic specifications has been explored
in [35] and [42], though neither work considered the partic-
ular issues that arise from testing without oracles. Other
work in this area has focused on consistency checking of ab-
stract data types [43], but has not sought to create oracles
for applications that do not otherwise have them.
Recent work in metamorphic testing has focused on its
applicability in different domains (e.g., [40, 50]), but not on
improving its general effectiveness in terms of scope, scale,
and sensitivity. Beydeda [6] first brought up the notion
of combining metamorphic testing and self-testing compo-
nents, but did not investigate an implementation or consider
the effectiveness on testing applications without oracles, as
we do here.
Finally, the work presented here extends our own previ-
ous research into function-level metamorphic testing [32],
by presenting a new execution model, a new technique for
discovering likely properties, a new framework architecture,
and the results of new empirical studies.
8. FUTUREWORK
Although the Columbus framework described above pre-
serves the internal state of the application during function-
level test execution, it does not prevent external side effects
that may change the system, e.g., files, a database, etc. To
address this, future work could consider integration with a
record/replay system such as Chronicler [5] to record exe-
cution of the program up to the point at which the meta-
morphic testing would be conducted, and then execute the
tests later and/or in a different environment so that poten-
tial changes to the system do not affect the original program
execution.
It may also be possible to apply Metamorphic Runtime
Checking to non-functional aspects of the program by spec-
ifying properties related to the system state – such as heap
memory usage, file descriptors, etc. – or“security invariants”
[14] that, if violated upon subsequent function invocations,
indicate a vulnerability. In our mutation analysis experi-
ments, we noticed that some mutations affected whether or
not memory was freed, caused buffer overflows, etc. but
did not change the program output and thus were consid-
ered “equivalent mutants”. Metamorphic properties related
to expected changes in system state may be able to detect
such faults and vulnerabilities.
Finally, even though the applications studied in our ex-
periment have no practical, general test oracle, some of their
constituent functions certainly might, and conventional unit
testing may be able to kill many of the mutations in the pro-
grams. Future research could investigate the effectiveness of
combining traditional unit testing with Metamorphic Run-
time Checking in such cases.
9. CONCLUSION
Metamorphic testing is an effective means of demonstrat-
ing faults in application domains without practical, general
test oracles, such as machine learning, optimization, and
scientific computing. In this paper, we have improved upon
previous work in this area by introducing Metamorphic Run-
time Checking, a new testing approach based on checking the
metamorphic properties of both the entire application and
its individual functions as the program runs. This paper has
also described the architecture of a testing framework called
Columbus, and discussed how it could be used to discover
metamorphic properties.
As shown in our empirical studies, Metamorphic Run-
time Checking is more effective than using runtime assertion
checking, and has three distinct advantages over metamor-
phic testing using application-level properties alone. First,
we are able to increase the scope of metamorphic testing, by
identifying properties for individual functions in addition to
those of the entire application. Second, we increase the scale
of metamorphic testing by running more tests for a given
input to the program. And third, we can increase the sen-
sitivity of metamorphic testing by checking the properties
of individual functions, making it possible to reveal subtle
faults that may otherwise go unnoticed.
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